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Abstract:
Experimentation with new voting tech -
nologies (NVT) typically starts with a pilot 
scheme on a lower level of government where 
not much harm can be done in case of failure. 
In this overview article across some of the 
most well-known federations, we are looking 
at practice and the legal bases for such pilots. 
The way NVTs are regulated is far from 
being harmonised and can be founded on 
an explicit legal basis or just as well on the 
lack thereof. The phase of the electoral cycle 
for which NVT are most common relates to 
electronic means of counting votes, whereas 
remote voting with the use of the Internet 
is still very much an exotic undertaking. 
A more recent dynamic can be observed for 
e-collecting schemes attached to e-petition 
systems. More centralised legislation does 
not seem necessary at this stage and will 
appear once a threshold of practice has been 
reached.
Keywords: electronic voting, Internet 
voting, e-counting, e-collection, e-petition
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1. Introduction
The following text assembles infor-
mation on how new voting technologies 
are regulated and applied in a sample of 
federated states and states that stop short 
of federalism, but still include one or more 
devolved territories. Many such states allow 
their sub-national units some degree of 
autonomy when it comes to the organisation 
and management of elections or referendum 
votes. Regarding the defi nition of new voting 
technologies (NVT) we apply a pragmatic 
nominal approach as they are listed in a more 
concise way elsewhere.1 In particular, we 
focus on the regulation and use of electronic 
1 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/104939, accessed 
7 March 2016.
voting machines, Internet voting systems, and 
electronic counting machines such as optical 
scanners, but also precision scales. The aim 
was not to come up with an exhaustive census 
of all sub-national institutional regulations 
and designs, but to introduce the reader to 
some of the most prominent examples we are 
aware of.
Given that the use of NVTs is still in 
its infancy, in most of the cases identifi ed 
below legislation regulating their use is 
undeveloped at national level and often non-
existent at sub-state level, even where sub-
state entities have some power to make their 
own laws on how elections within their remit 
are to be carried out. Typically, NVTs have 
been introduced on an ad hoc basis in selected 
cities and municipalities, taking advantage 
Résumé : 
Expérimenter les nouvelles techno lo-
gies de vote (NTV) commence habituellement 
par un chemin pilote à un niveau inférieur 
d’organisation de l᾿Etat, pour qu’en cas 
d’échec soient minimes les consé quences né-
ga tives. Dans cet article nous allons passer en 
revue la pratique et les bases légales pour de 
tels programmes pilotes dans certains Etats 
fédéraux les plus connus. La manière de régir 
les NTV est loin d’être harmonisée et peut 
s’appuyer sur une base juridique explicite, 
ou, tout aussi bien, sur l᾿absence de celle-ci. 
La phase du cycle électoral pour laquelle 
les NTV sont les plus communes concerne 
les moyens électroniques de dépouillement 
du vote, tandis que le vote à distance, par le 
biais de l’Internet, est toujours une pratique 
exotique. Une dynamique plus récente peut 
être observée pour les systèmes de collecte 
électronique attachés aux systèmes des péti-
ti ons électroniques. Une législation cen tra -
lisée ne paraît pas être nécessaire dans cette 
étape, mais apparaîtra une fois atteint un 
seuil de l’expérience derivée de la pratique.
Mots-clés : vote électronique, vote par 
Internet, dépouillement électronique, col lecte 
électronique, pétition électronique
Abstract:
Experimentarea noilor tehnologii de 
votare (NTV) începe în mod tipic cu o schemă-
pilot la un nivel de organizare inferior, la 
care să nu se înregistreze consecințe negative 
în caz de eşec. În acest articol, vom trece în 
revistă practica şi bazele legale pentru astfel 
de programe-pilot din unele dintre statele 
federale cele mai bine cunoscute. Modul în 
care sunt reglementate NTV este departe de 
a fi  armonizat şi se poate baza pe un temei 
juridic explicit sau, la fel de bine, pe lipsa 
acestuia. Faza ciclului electoral pentru 
care NTV sunt cele mai comune se referă 
la mijloacele electronice de numărare a 
voturilor, în timp ce votul de la distanță, prin 
utilizarea internetului, este încă o practică 
exotică. O dinamică mai recentă poate fi 
observată pentru sistemele de colectare elec-
tronică ataşate sistemelor de petiții elec-
tronice. O legislație centralizată nu pare a 
fi  necesară în această etapă, dar va apărea 
odată ce a fost atins un prag al experienței 
venite din practică.
Cuvinte-cheie: vot electronic, vot prin 
internet, numărare electronică, colectare 
electronică, petiție electronică
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of a permissive legal environment. Given the 
security fears associated with NVTs, court 
rulings have far more often had the effect of 
ending experimentation with NVTs, rather 
than enabling their implementation.
Bearing this in mind, a narrow focus 
on legislative acts would be insuffi cient in 
providing an informative overview of the 
state-of-the-art with respect to NVTs in 
decentralised states. Much of the focus of this 
paper is therefore on experimentation at the 
lowest level of governance (i.e., at the level 
of cities and municipalities) and on the role 
of national and sub-state legislation in either 
enabling or impeding such experimentation. 
We also provide information on the types of 
NVTs that have been used in each case and 
the roles they play in electoral procedures at 
different levels.
The paragraphs below show that the 
development of NVTs is not unidirectional. 
If a degree of optimism on the potential of 
these technologies prevailed around the turn 
of the century, in recent years this has given 
way to a wary vigilance, and many of the 
experiments carried out in the early years 
have either been put on hold or abandoned 
completely. The erratic pace with which 
NVTs have been deployed refl ects the fact 
that their use has been mainly the result of 
experimentation and has yet to be anchored 
by a fi rm legal grounding.
2. Case Studies 
Australia
The Australian Electoral Act es ta bli-
shes no explicit provisions allowing or pro-
hibiting electronic voting and counting tech-
no logy. Due to Australia’s strong federalism, 
all states and territories possess legislatorial 
power in these regards. In the case of Internet 
voting, New South Wales can be considered 
the most advanced, having introduced the 
i-Vote system for the 2011 state elections, 
allowing voters with disabilities or living 
far away from the next polling station to use 
Internet voting during an early vote period 
(Smith, 2016). The Parliamentary Electorates 
and Elections Act, in Section 120AC, states 
that “The Electoral Commissioner may 
approve procedures to facilitate voting by 
eligible electors at an election by means of 
technology assisted voting”2. Other than in 
New South Wales, the experience with elec-
tronic voting in Australia is rather ephemeral 
(Smith, 2016).
In addition to e-voting, the legislations 
in Victoria3, the Northern Territory4 and the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT)5 make 
reference to electronic technologies, being 
utilized in counting of ballot papers. These 
provide a legal basis for the implantation 
of e-counting technologies. Yet, from these 
solely the ACT has implemented e-counting. 
E-voting and e-counting technology was fi rst 
commissioned in 2000. In 2001, following the 
elections, the Australian Electoral Commission 
(AEC) issued a favourable evaluation of e-
counting technology, stating that it would be 
especially useful due to Australia’s complicated 
alternative vote electoral system (AEC, 2010). 
However, they did retain some sobriety due 
to the costs of acquisition and maintenance of 
the required scanners (AEC, 2010). Later that 
year, the ACT fi rst implemented e-counting 
for both electronic votes and traditional paper 
ballots. Yet, the preferences indicated by the 
voters had to be entered manually. After having 
reused the same system in 2004, the ACT’s 
electoral commission (ACTEC) switched 
to a new intelligent character recognition 
scanning system, which obviated the need 
for manual coding for the 2008 elections. 
This system has proven a success (ACTEC, 
2015). Furthermore, Southern Australia uses 
e-counting for local government, industrial 
and parliamentary elections.
Austria
The Austrian Internet voting experi -
ence was short lived. In 2009, the only legally 
binding election with Internet voting took 
place in the Federation of Students which 
2 http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/#/view/act/1912/ 
41/part5/div12a/sec120ac, accessed 13 May 2016.
3 In the case of Victoria, it is Part 6A of the Electoral 
Act from 2002.
4 In the case of the Northern Territory, it is Division 6A 
of the Electoral Act from 2004.
5 In the case of the ACT, it is Division 9.3 of the 
Electoral Act from 1992.
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was surrounded by a lot of political confl ict 
and disagreement about the usefulness of the 
technology (Krimmer et al., 2010). Following 
the debate, including the Consti tutional Court 
declaring a decree regulating the Internet 
voting not to be in line with underlying legis-
 lation, the Minister of Science and Research 
decided not to proceed with Internet voting for 
university elections (Goby and Weichsel, 2012).
Sub-national elections are governed 
by state law. As these must abide by the 
Constitution, there are currently no trials or 
projects advancing Internet voting at this 
level. Furthermore, there are no electronic 
counting machines used in Austria. Counting 
is undertaken in small voting districts with 
no more than about 700 voters per election 
authority. This setup allows for votes to be 
cast and counted exclusively in analogue 
form (BM.I – Wahlrecht, 2016).
Belgium
Belgium was one of the fi rst countries 
to introduce electronic voting machines. It 
began in 1991 on an experimental basis in 
two electoral districts, namely in Verlaine 
and Waarschoot. In 1994, a federal law, 
the Law Organising Automated Voting, 
was introduced to regulate the procedure.6 
The law allows electoral districts and 
municipalities to use automated voting 
systems during elections. It is very specifi c 
about the procedures to be used.7 By 1999, 
6 The original law may be accessed, both in French 
and in Dutch, at this webpage: www.elections.
fgov.be/fileadmin/user_upload/Elections2009/
f r / lo i s /11avr i l1994_lo i_vote_automat i se__
version_010207_.pdf, accessed on 7 March 2016.
7 The law stipulates that electronic voting takes place 
at a polling station, in which there is a voting machine. 
Voters are provided with an electronic card that they 
insert into a slot in the voting machine. The display 
screen on the voting machine shows the serial number 
and the symbol of all the lists of candidates and the 
voter uses an optical pen to mark the list of his/her 
choice. The voter is then given the opportunity to 
confi rm his/her vote before returning the card for 
inspection to the president of the polling station, and 
afterwards the card is inserted into an electronic ballot 
box, where it will remain after the data stored on it is 
read. Each polling station sends the data to the main 
offi ce of the town or region, where it is recorded and 
aggregated.
over 3.2 million voters (44% of the total 
electorate) cast their votes electronically.
Laws passed in 1999 and 2003 also 
allowed trials of an optical scanning system in 
which votes cast using the traditional pen and 
paper method were read electronically in the 
electoral districts of Chimay and Zonnebeke.8 
However, these trials were discontinued.
The Special Law of 13 July 2001 
transferred to the regions competences in 
legislation on and regulation and organisation 
of municipal and provincial elections. The 
2006 and 2007 local elections were the fi rst 
to be organised by the regions on the basis 
of this law.
Following concerns about the capa-
city of the automated voting system to verify 
votes and about the overall security of 
e-voting, the law on automated voting was 
amended in 2003.9 According to the revised 
law, votes cast electronically were also to be 
printed on paper.
In 2006 the Belgian government com -
missioned a comparative study from a consor-
tium of universities on e-voting systems in 
nine European countries (including Belgium), 
in order to decide whether it is appropriate 
to continue the e-voting experiment.10 The 
report recommended what is described as 
an “improved paper based voting system”, 
in which the voter casts his or her vote on 
8 See also Lecture optique pour les cantons de Chimay 
et Zonnebeke, available at: http://www.elections.
fgov.be/index.php?id=434&no_cache=1&print=1, 
accessed on 9 March 2016.
9 Act of organizing an automated voting control system 
by printing the votes cast on paper and amending the 
Act of 11 April 1994 organizing automated voting, 
the Law of 18 December 1998 organizing automated 
vote counting through an optical reading system 
and amending the Act of 11 April 1994 organizing 
automated voting and the electoral code (11 March 
2003), available at: www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/ cgi_loi/
change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn= 2003031136& 
table_name=loi, accessed on 7 March 2016.
10 Federal Public Service Interior (Intérieur Binnen landse 
Zaken, IBZ), Direction des Elections. BeVoting: Study of 
Electronic Voting Systems (Version 1.1, 15 April 2007), 
available at: http://www.elections.fgov.be/fi leadmin/
user_upload/Elections2011/fr/presentation/bevoting-1_
gb.pdf, accessed on 10 May 2016.
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a voting machine and the computer then 
prints the vote on a ballot that contains both a 
human-readable part, and a bar code that can 
be read by a machine. In 2008, the Federal 
Parliament passed a resolution allowing conti-
nued experimentation with automated voting. 
As a result, the Federal Public Service Interior 
sought a partner to design a new voting system 
to recommend to the regions. In 2012 the 
fi rm Smartmatic was selected as the voting 
technology provider for a fi fteen-year period 
in the Brussels-Capital region and in Flanders, 
but Wallonia opted out of the new system.
The Smartmatic system11 was used in 
the 2012 municipal and provincial elections, 
the 2014 elections to the regional parliaments 
in Brussels-Capital region and in Flanders, in 
the 2014 federal elections and in the 2014 
elections to the European Parliament. As 
previously, all electronic voting took place in 
polling booths and no Internet voting from 
private computers is permitted. Electronic 
voting only took place in Brussels-Capital 
region and in Flanders and, in these two 
regions, 153 out of 580 municipalities used 
the voting machines.
The government of Wallonia decided 
to end the experiment with electronic voting 
and return to traditional pen-and-paper based 
voting until a more reliable and secure system 
could be established in 2009. However, in 
2011, the same government decided to allow 
those municipalities that already used elec-
tronic voting to continue the experiment in the 
2012 elections, providing they met the extra 
costs incurred over and above the cost of the 
traditional system.12 A number of communes 
did decide to continue with the experiment 
and used the old system of the optical pen.
11 The Smartmatic technology works as follows: 
voters cast their votes on a voting machine that prints 
out a paper ballot with a bar code. The voter then scans 
the ballot using an electronic ballot box and deposits 
the paper copy in the box. This allows the vote to be 
counted both manually, and electronically.
12 PourEVA. Quand on choisit un mode de scrutin 
13,7 fois plus onéreux, on en assume le coût (26 
January 2014), available at: www.poureva.be/spip.
php?article787, accessed on 9 March 2016.
Canada
In Canada, the approach to the use 
of NVT such as Internet voting is much 
decentralised and mainly implemented on 
the local level in the provinces of Ontario 
and Nova Scotia (Goodman and Pammett, 
2014). In 2006, for example, this new voting 
channel was available in 20 municipalities 
in the province of Ontario. Approximately 
400,000 citizens were allowed to use it. For 
the 2010 elections, the fi gure of Ontario 
Internet voting towns and cities rose to 44 
and to 97 out of 444 municipalities in 2014. 
The hitherto largest Internet voting trials in 
Canada took place in Halifax, Nova Scotia, 
with an electorate of approximately 310,000.13 
Interestingly, in 2012 Halifax had to face a 
request for a judicial recount of the election 
results because of a district seat that was won 
with only six votes difference. Thanks to the 
recount procedures laid out already in a 2008 
by-law, there was no uncertainty about how 
to administer this task with Internet voting 
in place. Whereas the recount brought a 
mistake in one of the polling stations (result 
was submitted twice), no irregularities were 
detected for the votes cast via the Internet 
(Pammett and Goodman, 2013: 28).
Although there is no electronic coun t -
ing present in Canada at the national level, 
a number of municipalities use e-counting 
machines in local elections. These are seen also 
as trials for provincial and national elections. 
A plentiful amount of reasons, such as the 
higher complexity and rise in number, has led 
to the increased use of such machines in local 
elections. Furthermore, the elimination or, at 
least, diminution of human error has also been 
a leading motive (Elections Canada, 2014). 
Canada’s Elections Act does not mention 
electronic counting aids. Nevertheless, the 
wording is such as to not explicitly prohibit 
such aids, opening a possible adaption for 
future elections. In what’s more, the national 
13 Further Internet voting experiences in Nova Scotia 
included (see Pammett and Goodman, 2013, for more 
details): Cape Breton Regional Municipality (83,000 
electors, started 2012), Truro (10,000 electors, 2012) 
with the peculiarity that only electronic voting via the 
telephone or the Internet was available.
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electoral commission is not responsible for 
the implementation of municipal elections. 
Hence, municipalities possess a certain degree 
of autonomy (Elections Canada, 2015).
Germany
In Germany, e-voting effectively came 
to a halt when the Federal Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) ruled it un-
constitutional in 2009. Since then (almost)14 
no further moves have been made to enable 
an electronic voting process meeting those 
constitutional requirements. Before 2009, 
however, electronic voting was in use. The 
fi rst trials on sub-national level were carried 
out in 1998 at local elections in Cologne. 
A year later, the city of Cologne used the 
electronic voting machines for its European 
Parliament elections. In 2002 the same vo t-
ing machines came to use in the federal elec-
tions, however only on a small scale. The 
national elections of 2005 saw the fi rst large-
scale deployment of those voting machines. 
On that occasion, around two million voters 
in fi ve different German states cast their vote 
electronically. Soon after, the deployed voting 
machines came under increasing criticism. In 
the Netherlands, a similar voting machine was 
cracked successfully by a group of hackers, 
which led the Dutch government to decertify 
the further use of that system in 2006. That 
incident prompted two German citizens to 
bring a lawsuit before the Constitutional 
Court in Karlsruhe, where they eventually 
succeeded.15 So far, the last deployment of 
voting machines was on the occasion of the 
Landtagswahlen 2008 in Hesse.
It is, however, important to note that 
the federal electoral law of Germany (Bundes-
wahlgesetz) explicitly permits the use of voting 
machines (§ 35 Stimmabgabe mit Wahlgeräten). 
But “the Federal Voting Machines Ordi nance 
(Bundeswahlgeräteverordnung) is declared 
as unconstitutional because it does not ensure 
14 The Technical University of Darmstadt is deve l-
oping a system (“Easy Vote”) compatible with the 
requirements of the Basic Law.
15 The 2005 elections result, however, was deemed 
valid by the court since there has not been any evidence 
of fraud or systemic errors.
that only such voting machines are permitted 
and used which meet the constitutional 
requirements of the principle of the public 
nature of elections” 16 – in the words of the 
citation from the Constitutional Court17. The 
use of electronic voting machines in future 
German elections thus depends on whether 
transparent control mechanisms for ensuring 
an accurate vote count can be provided or not.
Electoral counting in turn is current -
ly allowed and deployed (since 2002) in 
some municipalities of the three Bundeslän-
der Hesse, Baden-Wurttemberg and Bavaria. 
In contrast to the voting machines, these 
counting systems are not subject to any 
admission procedure. In Hessen, §48a(8) 
of the municipal election ruling permits the 
automated (electronic) counting of votes, 
although the respective municipality law 
(Kommunalwahlgesetz) does not pro vide 
a corresponding authorisation. In Bavaria 
it is §82 of the Wahlordnung für die Ge-
meinde- und die Landkreiswahlen that pro-
vides a legal basis for electronic counting, 
while in Baden-Wurttemberg it is §37 of 
the Kommunalwahlordnung that assures 
electronic counting. In practice, the electronic 
counting of votes works as follows: the 
ballots are combined with a bar code next 
to the candidates’ names. The bar code is 
subsequently scanned with a respective 
bar code gun (or pen18). The votes are then 
transferred to a connected computer, on 
which the counting process is administered. 
On the occasion of the local elections in 2008 
in Bavaria, roughly a thousand municipalities 
used the above-mentioned system to elec-
tronically count the votes.
16 The latter principle is prescribed by the articles 38 
and 20 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz).
17 Press release of the Federal Constitutional Court 
regarding the Judgment of 3 March 2009: https://
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Pressemitteilungen/EN/2009/bvg09-019.html 
18 Following the 2005 national pilot study, the Senate 
of Hamburg decided to use a digital pen voting 
system for the upcoming local elections in 2008 
(Bürgerschaftswahl). However, these plans have 
ultimately been cancelled due to concerns over the 
accuracy of voting tallies.
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Increasingly, voting technologies should 
not only be understood in a narrow sense 
related to the act of voting or of coun ting 
the vote in an election or referendum. They 
could also be discussed in relation to e-peti-
tions as well as crowd-sourcing legislation 
platforms, such as the ones in Finland and 
Latvia that integrate online endorsing mech-
anisms (Serdült et al., 2016). In this sense, 
the example of the national, but also sub-
national, e-petition web sites in Germany 
are interesting. A petition right is defi ned 
in Article 17 of the German Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz) from 1949 and an e-collecting 
system was introduced in 2005, fi rst as a 
pilot, allowing for the digital submission 
and endorsement of a petition. The German 
e-petition was modelled ac cording to the 
Scottish system and can be considered to be 
one of the earliest and most advanced of its 
kind worldwide.
In Germany, a further distinction 
should be made between individual and 
public petitions, the latter can be submitted 
with the appropriate form on the Parliament’s 
offi cial website. With 50,000 signatures 
within four weeks, the petition can go public 
and eventually there will be a debate in the 
petition committee. Citizenship or residency 
is not required in order to submit or sign a 
petition. In case the petition is accepted as 
public, the petitioner is invited to participate 
in a session and speak in front of the 
committee.
The current system (see: http://epeti-
tionen.bundestag.de) has been online since 
September 2012. Since May 2014 there is 
a secure e-ID option available for holders 
of the new German identity card. Instead 
of a petitioner entering personal data, one 
is temporarily transferred to the provider of 
the e-ID and would return to the e-petition 
site once authentication has taken place. The 
use of this option is, however, not mandatory. 
Interestingly, there seems to be a top-down 
diffusion effect of e-petition systems going 
on to the sub-national level: the City State 
of Bremen started with public e-petitions 
in January 2010 and Rheinland-Pfalz, 
Schleswig-Holstein and Thüringen followed 
soon thereafter. All other Länder, such as 
Baden-Wurttemberg or Bavaria, have a sim-
ple submission site with an Internet form 
only.
Switzerland
Switzerland is characterised by 
two distinctive political institutions that 
have affected experimentation with new 
voting technologies such as Internet voting. 
First, its extremely decentralised system of 
federalism and, second, a tradition of direct 
democracy in which citizens are called to 
vote very frequently, 3–4 times a year on 
federal, cantonal and communal issues 
(Serdült, 2014). The interaction of these two 
formal institutions played an important role 
in shaping the approach to experimentation 
with Internet voting. First, although there is 
an overarching umbrella legislation on the 
national level to guarantee political rights, 
the cantons are within certain boundaries 
in charge of legislating, implementing and 
administering elections as well as referendum 
votes (Driza Maurer, 2013: 16 – 21). They are 
free to choose whether or not to implement 
Internet voting.
The introduction of Internet voting 
in Switzerland is therefore characterised by 
a piecemeal implementation and diffusion 
process very typical for its federal political 
system (Mendez and Serdült, 2014). Although 
Internet voting is typically only available in a 
selection of municipalities, it has nevertheless 
been available for more than a decade on a 
more or less permanent basis. In addition, an 
increasing number of cantons is offering the 
new voting channel to their citizens living 
abroad (Germann and Serdült, 2014).
Judicial review by the highest Swiss 
court has so far rejected complaints against 
Internet voting19 because it considered the 
legal basis provided by federal laws and in 
the cantons to be suffi cient and because the 
plaintiffs were not able to point to technical 
fl aws in the system able to change the fi nal 
19 See for example the Federal Court Decision from 
22 July 2014 (1C_136/2014) for a challenge of the vote 
result or the Federal Court Decision from 23 March 
2006 (1P.29/2006) regarding access to the source code 
of the Internet voting software, available at: www.bger.ch
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result of a vote (Driza Maurer, 2013; Hill, 
2015).
Whereas the introduction of Internet 
voting is regulated in a national ordinance20 
and in great detail, several cantons and cities 
have experimented with e-counting without 
much control from the national level. The 
cantons Geneva (since 2001) and Basle-City 
(since 2015) as well as the cities Bern (2014), 
Lausanne and several others in the canton of 
Vaud (2005), Fribourg (2004) and St. Gallen 
(2008) are using electronic means for vote 
counting, such as optical scanners, based on 
cantonal and municipal legislation only. They 
must, however, get approval from the Swiss 
Government.21
For the counting with precision 
scales22 and ballot counting machines23, as 
they are used in banks to count paper money, 
the votes are fi rst separated and sorted by 
hand and only thereafter they are counted by 
the machines. For optical scanners, the degree 
of technical complexity is higher because it is 
actually a software recognising the will of the 
voter. So far, the Federal Chancellery – as the 
20 All requirements and the whole legal basis are 
available on the website of the Federal Chancellery in 
German, French, Italian and also in English: https://
www.bk.admin.ch/themen/pore/evoting/07979/index.
html?lang=en, accessed on 3 March 2016.
21 See Federal Act on Political Rights, Art. 84: Use of 
technical aids:
“1. The Federal Council may authorise cantonal 
governments to enact provisions that derogate from 
this Act for the purposes of ascertaining the results of 
elections and popular votes by using technical aids.
2. Election and popular vote procedures that use 
technical aids shall require the approval of the Federal 
Council.” (See link above for the source.)
22 See for example the municipality of Maur in the 
Canton of Zürich: http://ch.mt.com/ch/en/home/
supportive_content/know_how/po/service/weighing_
votes.html 
23 See for example in the ordinance related to the Law on 
Political Rights in the Canton of Argovia, in paragraph 
30 (1): “For vote counting in elections and referendums 
the use of technical or electronic aids is permitted, 
provided these procedures are reliable and approved 
by the State Chancellery” [131.111 Verordnung 
zum Gesetz über die politischen Rechte (VGPR), 
25 November 1992, in force since 1 January 1993 
(https://gesetzessammlungen.ag.ch/frontend/versions/ 
1622, accessed 6 June 2016)].
national electoral management body – has 
only used very soft instruments in order to 
achieve a certain harmonisation of e-counting 
among the cantons in the form of a handout, 
in 2003, regarding the use of precision scales 
and eventually an additional one coming out 
in 2016. The imbalance regarding the (lack 
of) regulation for e-counting technology at 
national level in comparison to the detailed 
prescriptions for Internet voting is currently 
under review.
With three to four referendum dates a 
year, the Swiss electorate is called to vote on 
all three state levels more often than in any 
other polity. For many of these votes a prior 
collection of signatures is necessary. This is a 
tedious task which is sometimes outsourced to 
semi-professional signature collectors. Paying 
citizens for signing up for a certain cause is 
however forbidden by law.24 It would therefore 
seem obvious to develop a system of e-collec t -
ing for the direct democratic instruments 
requiring a certain number of signatures. Such 
a system does not exist yet (Serdült et al., 
2016) and is not foreseen as a priority in the 
national e-government strategy paper of the 
Swiss government “Digital Switzerland”25. In 
the absence of an offi cial e-collecting portal it 
is not surprising to see “wild”, semi-automatic 
signature collecting portals appearing such as 
the one set up by middle-left political circles 
called www.wecollect.ch. This not-for-profi t 
online platform supports initiative committees 
with an online solution allowing to fi ll in a pdf 
form which, however, still has to be signed and 
sent in by snail mail in the end of the process 
for verifi cation.
United Kingdom
Electoral law in the United Kingdom 
is not enshrined in a single legal act; instead 
there is a large volume of both primary and 
secondary legislation regulating elections 
(separately) in England, Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. Overall, the law tends 
to lack detailed provisions on how elections 
24 On campaign regulation regarding fi nancing and 
media, see Serdült, 2010.
25 http://www.bakom.admin.ch/themen/infosociety/
index.html?lang=en, accessed on 6 June 2016.
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are to be conducted, and the way to conduct 
certain procedures is left to the discretion of 
the returning offi cer for the constituency. The 
use of specifi c technologies in the conduct of 
elections is not specifi ed in the law. However, 
the 2000 Representation of the People Act 
allowed local authorities in England or Wales 
to submit proposals to the Secretary of State 
to carry out an electoral pilot scheme. Such 
pilot schemes can involve changes to how 
voting at local elections (district, county 
and borough council level) can take place 
and how votes cast are counted. The 2002 
Scottish Local Government (Elections) Act 
granted permission for similar pilot schemes 
for local government elections in Scotland. 
Both acts allowed voting to take place in 
other places than the polling stations. The 
2002 Scottish Local Government (Elections) 
Act allowed pilot schemes to alter the method 
used to cast votes. This was further refl ected 
in the 2004 Local Governance (Scotland) 
Act, which made provision for the election 
of councillors by Single Transferable Vote 
(STV) in Scottish local elections.
The fi rst trials to be held in the UK 
were carried out in the local elections of 
2000. Electronic vote counting was used 
in the Broxbourne Borough Council and 
Three Rivers District Council (both in 
Hertfordshire). In the case of Broxbourne, a 
specifi c bar code was associated with each 
candidate on the ballot paper and a bar code 
reader was used to swipe the bar code next to 
the name of the candidate that the voter had 
selected. In Three Rivers, optical scanning 
machines were used to read the ballot papers.
Electronic counting was introduced for 
London mayoral elections and the simultaneous 
elections to the Assembly for London in 2000. It 
was considered expedient to do so as the voting 
and counting procedures were quite complex; 
each voter was asked to cast three ballots: one 
for mayor (ranked in order of preference), 
one to elect a constituency Assembly member 
and one to elect an additional member on 
a London-wide basis – the result of the 
Supplementary Vote system of proportional 
representation that was used to elect the London 
Assembly. Optical scanners to scan the ballot 
papers were provided by the company Data 
& Research Services (DRS), which won 
the contract to provide the technology for 
the electronic vote. Electronic counting was 
used again in the 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016
Assembly and mayoral elections and the 
technology was once again provided by DRS.
2000 was also the year in which 
electronic voting was fi rst used in the United 
Kingdom. Five pilots were carried out in 
Bury Metropolitan Borough Council, Sal-
ford City Council and Stratford-upon-Avon 
District Council, in which voters were able to 
cast votes using a touch screen voting machine 
installed at polling stations. The votes were 
also subsequently counted electronically.
Signifi cantly, more pilot schemes were 
rolled out in local elections in 2002 and 
2003. In 2002, fi fteen local authorities used 
electronic counting mechanisms and eight 
of these used various electronic and remote 
voting procedures as well. Electronic counting 
either occurred automatically, as a result of 
electronic voting, when ballot papers were 
keyed into electronic scanners, or a semi-
automated counting method was used whereby 
an electronic wand was passed over ballot 
papers26. In total, nine local authorities used 
some form of electronic or remote voting: fi ve27 
used remote online voting (for example, from 
a personal computer), seven28 used electronic 
voting via touch screen kiosks in the polling 
station or elsewhere, while two29 allowed 
voting by SMS text messaging.30 In 2003, 
seventeen pilots also introduced a number of 
forms of electronic voting, including Internet 
voting, voting via touch screen kiosks and 
voting by SMS text messaging, while three 
26 In Broxbourne and Liverpool.
27 Two wards in Liverpool City Council, three wards 
in Sheffi eld City Council, two wards in St. Albans 
City and District Council, two wards in Crewe and 
Nantwich Borough Council and nineteen wards in 
Swindon Borough Council.
28 Sheffi eld, St. Albans, Crewe and Nantwich, as well 
as the London Borough of Newham, Stratford-upon-
Avon, Bolton Metropolitan Council and Chester City 
Council.
29 Liverpool and Sheffi eld.
30 See The Electoral Commission (2002). Modernising 
Elections: A Strategic Evaluation of the 2002 Electoral 
Pilot Schemes, available at: http://tinyurl.com/hhjxhtx, 
accessed on 2 March 2016.
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councils introduced special schemes for 
electronic counting.
From 2004, the pace of innovation 
began to slow down and in 2006 just two lo-
cal authori ties trialled the electronic counting 
of ballot papers. The fi nal round of pilots 
occurred in the 2007 local elections, fi ve local 
authorities pioneered Internet voting schemes31, 
while six used electronic counting of ballot 
papers32. In 2008 the Electoral Commission 
(EC) recommended that further pilots would 
be unnecessary and the introduction of Internet 
voting and counting more widely should only 
be introduced in combination with a more 
far-reaching plan for modernising elections, 
including a system of individual voter regis-
tration (introduced only in 2014), and proce-
dures implemented to ensure that e-voting 
solutions were secure and transparent. The 
EC described the e-voting trials as “broadly 
successful” insofar as it made voting easier, 
but identifi ed a number of problems involving 
accessibility, public understanding of the pre-
registration process and (occasionally) technical 
issues. The EC rated electronic counting more 
negatively, pointing to signifi cant technical 
problems that, on occasions, even made it 
necessary to abandon the electronic count and 
revert to traditional counting methods. Even 
though the government disagreed with the EC 
report and pledged to continue the schemes, no 
further such pilot schemes have been held by 
local authorities.
A rather original method of voting 
was used in September 2006 in the small Scot-
tish town of Menstrie, Clackmannanshire, for 
local community council elections. Digital 
pens were used to record the votes on special 
digital paper. There is no evidence, however, 
that the trial was repeated.33
31 Rushmore Borough Council, Sheffi eld City Council, 
Shrewsbury and Atcham Borough Council, South 
Bucks District Council and Swindon Borough Council.
32 Bedford Borough Council, Breckland District 
Council, Dover District Council, South Bucks District 
Council, Stratford-on-Avon District Council & 
Warwick District Council.
33 BBC News, Electronic Voting “World First” 
(27 Septem ber 2006), available at: http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/tayside_and_
central/5385086.stm, accessed on 2 March 2016.
In Scotland, STV for local elections 
was introduced in 2007 according to the 
provisions of the 2004 Local Governance 
(Scotland) Act. Because the counting process 
for STV is complex and arduous, the Scottish 
government decided that the traditional 
manual counting of ballot papers should 
be replaced by an electronic vote count 
for both the local and Holyrood (Scottish 
parliamentary) elections, which were held 
simultaneously, on the 3rd of May 2007. The 
count took place in 32 counting stations 
across Scotland and electronic scanning 
machines were used. A number of problems 
were identifi ed with the procedure, including 
a database malfunction within the electronic 
counting system in some of the count 
stations, and a disproportionate number of 
ballots were rejected. In subsequent elections 
Holyrood and local government elections 
were held separately and electronic counting 
was abandoned for the Holyrood elections. 
Electronic counting was used again for the 
Scottish local elections of 2012, although 
another company was contacted to implement 
the system (CGI replaced DRS as the main 
provider). The 2012 experience was widely 
hailed as successful and the same company 
will be used to implement electronic voting 
for the 2017 local elections.
United States of America
The USA is one of the countries with 
the oldest traditions and a frequent use of 
citizen initiated referendums. More than 
half of the US American states have some 
degree of direct democracy mechanisms in 
their constitutions, which in principle could 
make use of Internet voting34 and e-collecting 
for their respective signature gathering 
procedures triggering a vote. Indeed, some 
US states, such as California and Oregon, 
have vibrant systems of direct democracy 
34 Since the history and legal quarrels in US states on 
electronic voting machines are well-known and do-
cumented, we are highlighting here the less commonly 
known regulations in the fi eld of e-collecting. Regarding 
Internet voting, the general tone in the USA is very 
critical. Besides experiments for primary elections and 
military personnel overseas, there was not much practice 
in recent years (Simons and Jones, 2012).
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involving citizen initiated referendums. 
Unlike Switzerland, there is, however, no 
tradition of direct democracy at the federal 
level. But, whereas Switzerland has not 
yet looked into making use of e-collecting, 
there is noticeable demand for upgrading the 
signature collecting via more effi cient online 
means in several US states.35
All states wanting to use e-collecting 
systems connected to referendum votes have 
thus far been blocked by the courts. As is 
typical of the US, there has been a fl urry of 
legal activity surrounding e-collecting as 
proponents and opponents have mobilised via 
the courts. Prominent cases include states such 
as Utah, California, Tennessee and Nebraska.
Following a Utah Supreme Court 
ruling on the validity of e-signatures, the 
Lieutenant Governor issued an interim rule 
allowing the collection of e-signatures. The 
interim rule remained in effect for 120 days 
from 8 July 2010; initiators were required 
to use an “electronic packet” created by the 
Governor’s offi ce and a signee could only sign 
in a petition circulator’s presence. Following 
that period, state offi cials were scheduled to 
work with the Utah Legislature to establish a 
permanent rule in the state code. Opponents 
argued that the rule did not allow for the 
chief purpose of electronic signatures – to 
facilitate signature gathering by allowing it 
to be done online – and restricted petitioners. 
In early 2011 Senate Bill 165 – a measure 
banning e-collecting – was introduced. The 
Bill was approved in March by the Utah 
House of Representatives and enacted into 
law following approval by the Governor.36
In June 2011, the California First 
District Court of Appeals issued a ruling in 
Ni v. Slocum prohibiting electronic signature 
collection in California. Verafi rma founder 
Michael Ni fi led the suit, challenging San 
Mateo County’s rejection of an electronic 
signature in favour of Proposition 19 
(Regulate, Control and Tax Cannabis Act 
of 2010). In its decision, the court ruled that 
35 For an overview of the debate in the USA, see: 
https://ballotpedia.org/Electronic_petition_signature 
36 http://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title20A/Chapter1/20A-
1-S306.html?v=C20A-1-S306_2014040320140513, 
accessed on 3 March 2016.
the term “affi x”, as used in California law, 
implies a physical signature.37
Legislative Bill 566 introduced by 
Nebraska State Senator Paul Schumacher 
would have allowed proponents to collect 
signatures online as long as they pay a fee 
to authorities for operating costs. The Bill 
died after being referred to government, but 
another version (Bill 214) was proposed by 
Mr Schumacher in 2015 to establish e-collect-
 ing for initiative and referendum petitions. 
In April, the Bill was still on hold in the 
Government, Military and Veteran Affairs 
Committee, but it has since been abandoned.38
In Nashville-Davidson County, Ten-
nessee, a proposal was made for a petition 
campaign for marijuana decriminalisation 
with an intention to use e-collecting. County 
Election Commission said they would not 
allow electronic signatures. A lawsuit was 
fi led against the Election Commission in 
January 2014 seeking to require the  commi-
ssion to accept electronic signatures.Ulti-
mately the initiative did not progress to the 
ballot because the group behind the initiative 
did not submit any petitions by the deadline 
on 18 May 2015.
As we can see, legislation has been 
enacted in some states such as Utah explicitly 
prohibiting e-collecting, while the court in 
California clarifi ed that a signature implies 
a physical signature, i.e., not electronic. In 
Tennessee, the Election Commission has 
pro hibited e-collecting. These have all been 
states with instruments of direct democracy. 
Furthermore, at the state level we found no 
evidence of e-collecting being made available 
for petitions in the US, a weaker signature 
gathering instrument that does not trigger 
the potential for un-mediated policy change. 
There is one notable exception, however, at 
the Federal level. Launched by the Obama 
Administration in 2011, “We the people” is 
an e-petition system that provides a platform 
for citizens to petition the US administration’s 
37 http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20CACO%20
20110630026/NI%20v.%20SLOCUM, accessed on 
3 March 2016.
38 https://ballotpedia.org/Nashville-Davidson_County_ 
Metro_Marijuana_Decriminalization_Initiative_
(August_2015), accessed on 3 March 2016.
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policy experts (see https://petitions.whitehouse.
gov). The availability of such an instrument, 
with a fully-fl edged e-collecting system at the 
federal level, contrasts vividly with dynamics at 
the state level, where no e-collecting is possible 
for petitions. The big difference is the lower 
degree of consequentiality on the national level 
(Serdült et al., 2016).
3. Conclusions
This short overview across some of the 
most prominent federated polities confi rmed 
that there is a vibrant, ongoing but at the same 
time very scattered experience with NVTs in 
all of our cases. Comparing the different NVTs 
we looked at (electronic or Internet voting, 
e-counting, e-collecting to some degree), 
we are not able to detect a clear emerging 
pattern. The way NVTs are regulated is far 
from being harmonised and can be founded 
on an explicit legal basis or just as well the 
lack thereof. Explanatory factors such as the 
degree of federalism, the legal system as well 
as political culture certainly play a role, but 
we also observe a very much erratic dynamic 
over time. Experimentation can come to 
a sudden halt by technical failures or the 
decision of a court or ministry.
NVTs seem to be rather sticky in the 
sense of a path dependency. Early adopters of 
electronic voting machines have either fully 
or partially abandoned their use (Belgium, 
Germany, UK) or continued, but not made 
any serious attempts to make a transition to 
the Internet age. Constituencies with current 
Internet voting trials are usually not early 
adop ters and take a very piecemeal trial and 
error approach to introducing this new voting 
channel.
Within a country only a handful of 
municipalities or regions typically take the lead 
(Australia, Canada, Switzerland), be it because 
of a certain familiarity with remote voting 
such as in Switzerland, where postal voting is 
generalised and very popular, be it because of 
rather pragmatic concerns in constituencies, 
where the distance to the poll can be very 
long, such as in Australia and Canada, or 
be it because of political leaders wanting to 
be at the forefront of technical development 
seeking a positive image. Except for Austria, 
all our selected countries show a long-standing 
and rather expanding experimentation with 
the use of e-counting technologies. Whereas 
e-collecting systems do not seem to make 
any inroads into polities with strong, binding 
elements of direct political participation in the 
forms of referendums. A certain dynamism 
can be observed by a number of parliaments 
opening up with the help of e-petitions 
including more or less elaborate systems of 
electronic signature collection.
Whether the further de-materialisation 
of the vote will continue and lead to an 
alienation of the voter or is even to be 
expected by a younger generation entering 
political maturity is still an open question.
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